decorous and humane. When faced with refusal to allow organ donation, he must see the other's point of view even if it conflicts with his own. If he appears authoritarian or inhumane with a patient's relatives, not only will he risk refusal of consent to organ removal, but he may never be invited to that particular hospital again.
These and other problem areas have caused concern among doctors unfamiliar with transplantation, and may have made some doctors reluctant to call in the local transplant team when a case of brain death occurred.
The last decade has seen the evolution of guidelines to help doctors whose patients are organ donors, and some of these are summarized in this paper together with a brief section on the law. It is also useful and interesting to see how the present situation has evolved so, where relevant, brief historical notes are added.
The Human Tissue Act (1961) This law deals with the use of a body for therapeutic purposes, medical education, or research; the needs of transplant surgery (which require that organs be removed without delay to ensure survival for successful transplantation) are not given any special consideration in this Act. However, it is clear that if a person has stated whilst he was alive that his organs could be removed, then the removal of organs may be lawfully carried out after death. But there has been confusion over that part of the Act which allows organ removal if a person has expressed a wish before his death 'either in writing or orally in the presence of two witnesses during his last illness' that his body may be used for therapeutic purposes. The problem arose in 1973 shortly after the kidney donor card was introduced by the DHSS, and concerned the legal status of a signed card found in the possession of a potential kidney donor; under these conditions, could a person in charge of such a body authorize the removal of organs without enquiring whether the next of kin objected beforehand? The matter was never tested in court, although the Secretary of State actually denied that a signed donor card was a legal document. In view of the wording on the card (see Figure I ) this ruling was clearly discouraging for transplant surgeons who felt that the DHSS simply regarded the card as a public relations Figure I. exercise -as a leaflet rather than as a legal document (Sells 1973) . Fortunately the Department reversed this view (DHSS 1975) and the donor card is not only officially recognized as legally acceptable evidence of a person's wish for his organs to be removed after death, but it seems to be the spear-head of the Department's latest drive to improve matters for renal patients.
The donor cards are now widely available, and it seems likely that more people admitted to intensive care wards will be carrying them. It is therefore most important that notice be taken of such a card if it has been signed by a brain-damaged patient, and the transplant team notified as soon as brain death is apparent.
If no permission has been given by the patient then 'the person lawfully in possession of the body, may authorize the removal of any part from the body ... if, having made such reasonable enquiry as may be practicable, he has no reason to believe ... that the surviving spouse or any surviving relative of the deceased objects to the body being so dealt with'. This law raised many questions because, although the general intent is clear, the conditions as stated are rather opaque:
Who is the person lawfully in possession of the body? A guidance circular to NHS Authorities (DHSS 1975) says that the Area Health Authority is in possession legally, until the body is claimed by the relatives; but since an Authority is not a person, it is presumed that an Area Administrator, or his deputy (who may be a senior nurse or doctor), is the person in possession of the body.
What is 'reasonable enquiry as may be practicable'? The man who drafted this paragraph in the Act obviously assumed that 12 to 24 hours could elapse after death before allowing organ removal to proceed, without the organs being damaged to the extent that they would be useless for therapeutic, research or educational purposes. In 1961, when the law was drafted, the need to remove kidneys within 30 to 60 minutes after cardiac arrest was not universally appreciated. The new need for speed has focused on the necessity to define 'reasonable' and 'practicable', since these terms define the limits within which an administrator must work ifhe is to allow the legal removal of organs.
There have been attempts to change this law, and two types of revision have been suggested: 'limited amendment' and 'opting out'.
Limited amendment: This suggestion, made formally by the British Transplantation Society (1975) in its document for discussion, aimed at clarifying the existing law rather than altering its intent. The committee which issued the document included an Oxford lawyer, whose amendment included the following substitute for the extract quoted above: 'if having made such reasonable enquiry as is both reasonable and practicable in the time available, he has no , reason to believe that the deceased had expressed an objection .. .' Amendments also appear which aim at clarifying the meaning of the term 'person legally in possession of the body'.
There have been no moves yet to implement such a 'limited amendment' as that advocated by the British Transplantation Society. The prevailing view' seems to be that to attempt amendment would be to run the risk of the law being disadvantageously changed by minority objectors who disapprove of the whole principle of transplantation. Be that as it may, most transplant surgeons (who are people at risk, should they not work within the Act) seem to find this Act, together with the explanatory and supportive Department circular (DHSS 1975) , adequate.
Reform'toan' opting out' system:Attempts have been made repeatedly to change the law so that a person's organs could be removed without his permission and without asking the relatives if they object. Such a change in the law would mean that a person in charge of the body could assume that the patient would not object to his body being so dealt with, unless it could be shown that the patient had recorded his objection during his or her life time. Therefore to 'opt out' of organ donation would require a person to record his intentions concerning the fate of his body, either on a central computer, or in the form ofa written statement carried with him at all tinies.
It is claimed by some that taking the decision away from the relatives would increase the number of kidneys made available to transplant surgeons; yet a close examination of the information available suggests that the rate-limiting factor in cadaver kidney transplantation is not the objection of the deceased's relatives. In a personal series of over 200 interviews with relatives of dead people, the author met objections to nephrectomy on 12 occasions; 5 of these patients were children with brain death -when the emotion surrounding the patient's condition was exceptionally intense -and in two other cases the patient's relatives relented and reversed their decision. In Merseyside 94% of relatives recorded no objection to nephrectomy, and many obtained evident relief that some good would come out of an otherwise tragic situation.
Such interviews between relatives of brain-dead people and transplant surgeons are often disturbing, and it is essential for legal as well as humanitarian reasons to conduct the interview in the presence of a nurse or a doctor known to the relatives, who can give support to the request and answer any questions which may arise concerning the diagnosis of death. It is not universally thought necessary to ask the relatives to sign a 'consent form' at a time of such emotional stress, although to the author's knowledge one coroner does require this; normally a statement in the donor's hospital notes signed by the witness and the surgeon will suffice.
Ifthese simple rules are obeyed and if the interviewer approaches the relatives with sympathy and understanding, avoiding any unreasonable pressure, then most people will not object to organ donation if they believe that is what the donor would have wished. Many anticipate the question, others suggest that organ removal should take place, and some have discussed the matter before the relative's death and the answer is already in their minds. In only two cases in my experience have the relatives been helped by the knowledge that the patient had expressed his wish during life by signing a donor card. Many surgeons believe that the much wider publication of the donor card would lead to less mental trauma on the part of relatives who would thereby be spared the misery and uncertainty of decision making at the death-bed of a loved one.
This evidence of compliance in the public has been confirmed by several small public opinion polls. In our own survey in Liverpool by the Liverpool Group! (1974), 805 church-going people responded to a questionnaire on transplantation: 93% of responders were in favour of the general principles of organ transplantation; 84% were willing to give their kidneys for transplantation after death, wanted to make a statement about it during life, and approved the idea of a central register on which people's decisions about organ donation could be recorded; 22% thought that relatives should be able to veto the donor's wishes after his death, but 69% thought that under no circumstances should the relatives be able to override the donor's wishes.
A similar survey undertaken by Gallup Poll for the British Kidney Patients Association (E Ward 1978, personal communication) indicated that when asked: 'Would you agree to donate your kidneys to be used after death for transplant purposes?', 68% of 1030 members of the public replied 'yes', 19% replied 'no', and 13% 'did not know'. Furthermore, 82% thought it proper for hospital admission forms to carry the question 'Are you a kidney donor?'.
It seems from these enquiries that the principles of cadaver organ transplantation are approved by the majority of people in the United Kingdom, that most people would consent to their organs being removed after death, and that very few people object to their relative's kidneys being transplanted after death.
The principle of opting out by recording objection to kidney donation on a central computer does not elicit such firm public or parliamentary support: of 1000 people in West Lothian (Dalyell 1974) , 36% favoured radical alteration of the law to some form of opting-out system, although in the poll quoted by Ward, 57% favoured this. A recent debate in the House of Commons revealed significant ministerial and back-bench reservations concerning the practicability as well as the rectitude of opting-out legislation (Hansard 1978) .
Proponents ofradical change further suggest that kidneys are lost because relatives can often not be found before the patient dies. This is a theoretical objection rather than a practical one, since most donors are maintained on ventilators for at least 12 hours before nephrectomy I The Liverpool Grou" (1974) . This Committee consisted of the Rt Rev the Bishop of Warrington; Mr S R Barter (HM .Coroner); Mr Michael Redmond, Mrs E Christie (Lawyers); Mr D Bamber, (University of Liverpool). 15000 questionnaires were distributed among Catholic and Anglican parishes. 805 replies were analysed. whilst brain death is diagnosed; if the relatives are traceable they can nearly always be found in the time available. Since the majority of relatives do not object to nephrectomy, it seems most unlikely that opting-out legislation would significantly improve the supply of kidneys for transplantation.
In those rare cases (1.5% of all cases in Merseyside) where relatives could not be traced and where no donor card was found on the patient, then the person in charge of the body had to decide whether the enquiry into the possibility of the patient or his relatives objecting has been reasonable and practicable before permitting organs to be removed from a dead patient. Nephrectomy has been carried out in Liverpool on two such occasions, and three patients now have well-functioning transplants as a result.
It appears then, that despite the problems of interpreting the law, the rules laid down by the Act are sufficiently unrestrictive to allow kidney transplants to be removed from the great majority of patients who are referred as donors without legal complications.
The MacLennan Report
In 1969 the Health Ministers sought guidance from a multidisciplinary group on matters of public concern arising from organ transplantation. The resulting document (MacLennan 1969) laid down the ethical ground rules for cadaveric organ transplantation; the salient conclusions are summarized as follows: (I) The process of determining death (which is a clinical and not a legal matter) should be carried out, and death certified, by two doctors independent of the transplant team, and their observations should be independently recorded in the patient's notes, which may be subsequently scrutinized by a coroner. (2) Donors should not be transported between hospitals purely to facilitate transplantation. (3) Public education and enrolment forms should be encouraged. (4) The group considered that it was up to the transplant surgeons and nephrologists to foster cooperation within the rest of the profession and thereby increase the referral rates of organ donors from district hospitals and neurological units.
The most important element, summarized in (I), drew attention to the need to isolate decision making on matters concerning the management of the patient from considerations regarding possible organ donation. This principle has been recently reinforced in the Combined Colleges document on Brain Death (see below) in which it was stated that a consultant or his deputy, and one other doctor should make the decision to discontinue artificial ventilation.
It is important to note also that the group did not suggest that the transplant surgeon should be absolved from his duty stated in the Human Tissue Act, 1961 to 'satisfy himself by personal examination of the body that life is extinct'.
Thus the highest standards of ethical conduct are recommended in this widely accepted report, whereby considerations regarding possible organ removal do not undermine standards of medical care. Although not legally binding, the guidelines would be likely to have considerable relevance in a case involving a transplant surgeon, if they were invoked by the prosecution and if the surgeon were found not to have conformed with their recommendations.
The role of the Coroner
The relationship between the transplant surgeon, the coroner and the donor's doctor, requires special mention. The doctor in charge of an injured patient who dies in his care must notify the coroner if the cause of death is not known, if the death is not due to natural circumstances, or if the patient belongs to any other category which the coroner defines as notifiable; he need not notify the coroner if the death is natural and the diagnosis is known. The coroner's responsibility is twofold: to make certain that death had occurred before organ removal; and to protect forensic evidence. Satisfying the first demand is fairly simple: the reasons for diagnosing death, and the time of the diagnosis must be written in the notes by the two certifying doctors independent of the transplant team (and also by the transplant surgeon before organ removal), to allow verification of these facts at a subsequent inquest. The definition of death may raise problems of interpretation, but most coroners (indeed most lawyers) define the legal state and time of death as 'that state, and that time when a doctor confirms that death has taken place'.
The second responsibility of the coroner, that of preserving forensic evidence, is less easily accommodated by transplant surgeons. Any case of death arising from manslaughter, murder, or dangerous driving, will usually be denied by the coroner since, if a prosecution is in preparation, a second examination by a defence pathologist may be necessary, and interference with the body at the time of death may possibly compromise the evidence. Such a ruling may on its face value seem difficult to justify when a patient's injuries do not involve the kidneys and ureters, but it must be remembered that the coroner has absolute authority in this field and although an appeal to his discretion is sometimes worthwhile the coroner's ruling must be obeyed.
Therefore, in every coroner's case which is being considered as a donor, the surgeon must enquire of the coroner, or his officer, whether organ removal is permissible. There is welcome evidence that many coroners are actively helpful in their attitude to organ donation, and that good working relationships can be maintained between the coroner's office and the regional transplant centre. Such cooperation has been officially sanctioned by the Law Society and the Home Office (Home Office 1977).
Diagnosis of death
There is much variation of thought in the medical profession concerning the criteria by which death is defined. With a few exceptions, it seems clear that death is a process, rather than an instantaneous event, and because of this essential fact, the diagnosis of death can be made when it is apparent that a person has undergone irreversible brain injury such that his continued existence depends on a machine, that he has no personal identity, and that his chances of regaining an independent life with his own personal identity are nil. Many doctors agree with this concept, and do not accept the condition of permanent cardiac arrest as the only criterion of death. In practice this has meant that patients with severe brain damage who, after a period of observation and positive pressure ventilation, exhibit signs of total brain death after careful and repeated examination by two doctors may be certified as dead. The conditions and physical signs which constitute brain death have been conscientiously and exhaustively listed by the Conference of the Royal Colleges (1976) at the suggestion of the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Health and Social Security, and following advice from an interdisciplinary subcommittee independent of transplant surgeons or physicians. Their criteria are summarized as follows:
(1) The patient is deeply comatose. (a) There should be no suspicion that this state is due to depressant drugs. (b) Primary hypothermia as a cause of coma should have been excluded. (c) Metabolic and endocrine disturbances which can be responsible for or can contribute to coma should have been excluded. (2) The patient is being maintained on a ventilator because spontaneous respiration had previously become inadequate or had ceased altogether. (a) Relaxants (neuromuscular blocking agents) and other drugs should have been excluded as a cause of respiratory inadequacy or failure. (3) There should be no doubt that the patient's condition is due to irremediable structural brain damage. The diagnosis of a disorder which can lead to brain death should have been duly established. Two points need to be made to clarify the important role which this advice fulfils in organ transplantation. First, the donor must be shown to suffer brain stem destruction as well as cortical death; a decerebrate patient able to breathe spontaneously is not a case of brain death, as defined above, and cannot be considered a donor. Second, the diagnosis of death can be made while the heart is still beating and while the function of transplantable organs such as the kidneys, liver and heart, is still normal. This important fact allows time (a few hours only are necessary) for the transplant team to take all necessary steps to fulfil the legal and ethical rules described above before the patient is moved to the operating theatre and the organs are removed. It will also be possible during this interval to verify and ensure that blood pressure and renal function are optimal by appropriate adjustment of fluid and electrolyte balance, and to administer diuretics and drugs to prevent renal vasospasm. Using such a protocol in Scandinavia it was possible to achieve immediate function in 90% of kidney transplants when kidneys were removed from brain-dead patients (Claes & Blohme 1973) . Whereas British experience suggests (National Organ Matching Service 1977) that the transplantation of kidneys removed when cardiac arrest has occurred before nephrectomy has commenced results in 17% kidney death, and a high rate of prolonged anuria in the recipient due to acute tubular necrosis.
Diagnostic tests for confirmation ojbrain death

Logistics
It is clearly useless to notify the transplant unit at or after the cessation of ventilation. At least two hours is usually needed for the transplant surgeon to confirm brain death, interview relatives, contact the coroner and hospital secretary (or other 'person in charge of the body') and arrange the time of the operation with the theatre staff. If the surgeon is harassed by the knowledge that the donor's circulation is failing or has ceased, then there is a risk that the organs may be injured during too hasty a nephrectomy; grafts may thus be lost, and worse, the cooperation of relatives and hospital staff may be forfeited if too much haste is evident. An outline of the events preceding donor nephrectomy is shown in Figure 2 . This has proved a useful check list in Merseyside hospitals where donor kidneys have been removed, and it has now been circulated to all Accident and Emergency Departments in the United Kingdom.
Despite the very considerable progress which has been made in making more facilities available to patients with end-stage renal failure, the dynamic concept of holding patients on . dialysis whilst waiting for a transplant is doomed so long as there is a shortage of organ donors. This bottle-neck means that smaller numbers of eligible patients can be given dialysis machines. , From data presented above, it seems that the public attitude is helpful and cannot be blamed for the shortage; the Human Tissue Act (1961) together with the MacLennan Report and the DHSS advisory letter (DHSS 1975) provide a reasonably unrestrictive framework within which transplant surgeons and donor doctors can operate; most coroners now cooperate effectiv,ely with regional transplant centres; the brain death criteria issued in 1976 have gone unchallenged by the profession and can therefore be assumed to be acceptable; and over 18 000 people died in hospital from accidental injury in 1976, although what proportion were potential organ donors is a matter for speculation. However, a regional survey of the availability of cadaveric kidneys (Dombey & Knapp 1975) carried out in Nottingham indicated, as a conservative estimate, that 43 kidneys per million population could be available from district hospital sources, assuming that all suitable cases were referred to local transplant units (in arriving at this figure the authors took into account the rather high objection rate by relatives of 24%). If such a figure were applied nationwide a conservatively estimated 2365 donor kidneys would appear to be available. Yet only 700 cadaveric grafts were transplanted in 1976/77 (National Organ Matching Service 1977) due to the small numbers of donors being referred from intensive care units and neurological centres. A comprehensive analysis of attitudes to this subject among hospital statTwas undertaken in South Wales (Crosby & Waters 1972) ; the majority of doctors (80%) and nurses (68%) accepted that renal transplantation was a justifiable form of treatment; when apprehension was expressed, it focused on difficulty in diagnosing death and the possibility of causing extra distress to relatives. There does not seem to be much documentary evidence that hospital doctors are actively opposed to cadaver kidney donation.
Where then is the resistance to be found? The answer is contained in a statement by Sir George Young MP in a recent debate in the House of Commons (Young 1978) : 'Doctors seem very willing to act when their patient is a potential recipient of a kidney, because it is their patient who is ill. They seem far less willing to act when their patient is a potential donor, because he has died. This is an illogical position for the medical profession to be in, because there is a recipient only when there is a donor, and equal initiative is required in both cases'.
There is now much evidence that kidneys and other organs can be safely and decorously removed from dead people in hospital, by cooperation between doctors in charge of braininjured patients, and transplant surgeons; that the existence of such arrangements in no way threatens the safety of other patients with recoverable brain injury; and that the successful transplantation of such organs provides health and independence for a large number of renal patients every year, as well as improving the availability of kidney machines.
It is earnestly hoped by all transplant surgeons that equal initiative can be taken by all hospital doctors to solve the problems of supply and demand in clinical renal transplantation.
